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ABSTRACT 
Crowdsourcing marketplace as a new platform for companies or individuals to source ideas or works from the public has 
become popular in the contemporary world. A key issue about the sustainability of this type of marketplace relies on the 
effort that problem solvers expend on the online tasks. However, the predictors of effort investment in the crowdsourcing 
context is rarely investigated. In this study, based on the expectancy theory which suggests the roles of reward valence, trust 
and self efficacy, we develop a research model to study the factors influencing effort. Further, the non-linear relationships 
between self efficacy and effort is proposed. Based on a field survey, we found that: (1) reward valence and trust positively 
influence effort; (2) when task complexity is high, there will be a convex relationship between self efficacy and effort; and (3) 
when task complexity is low, there will be a concave relationship between self efficacy and effort. Theoretical and practical 
implications are also discussed.  
 
Keywords 
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INTRODUCTION 
Crowdsourcing is a new outsourcing approach that takes tasks as an open call to an undefined, large group of people (Howe 
2006). This approach has become more and more popular nowadays for advancing innovation, global IT outsourcing 
(Agerfalk and Fitzgerald 2008; Gefen and Pavlou 2006), idea competition or open innovation (e.g., where companies collect 
innovative ideas from customers) (Ebner, Leimeister, Bretschneider and Krcmar 2008; Leimeister, Huber, Bretschneider and 
Krcmar 2009), and knowledge contribution, such as Wikipedia and online question and answer sites (e.g., Yahoo! Answers) 
(Dutta, Roy and Seetharaman 2010). 
One special crowdsourcing marketplace, which we focus on in this study, is a virtual community in which people who needs 
others’ help to complete a task (e.g., namely seekers) can broadcast their task requirements and provide certain monetary 
rewards, whereas other members of the community participate in these tasks and compete for the rewards (e.g., namely 
solvers). Examples of this type of crowdsourcing marketplace include Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and myTino.com in the 
USA as well as Taskcn.com and Witkey.com in China. 
As the sustainability of virtual communities (e.g., Open Source Software Community, OSS) heavily relies on the persistent 
effort of participants (Fang and Neufeld 2009; Ke and Zhang 2009), it is important to understand the motivators and/or 
inhibitors determining solvers’ participation effort (Sun et al. 2011; Sun et al. 2012). Specifically, three barriers inhibiting 
solvers’ participation can be identified as follows. First, the monetary rewards provided are relatively low. For instance, in 
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Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, the payments are around 0.1$ for most of tasks. Thus whether participants can be adequately 
motivated by the low payments should be concerned. Second, reward providers’ opportunistic behavior is also a barrier 
blocking participants’ continuous participation. It is reported that when some reward providers attain a satisfying solution 
from participants, they do not pay this participant. Instead, they register another new client as participant, submit a similar 
solution, and finally title themselves as winners. Thus, trust is also an important issue that needs to be addressed. Third, the 
competition between participants is very intensive in the crowdsourcing marketplace (Yang, Adamic and Ackerman 2008a). 
The participants for the tasks in Mechanical Turk are counted by thousands. This requires participants to have adequate 
ability to well complete the tasks. Therefore, ability concerns may influence solvers’ effort investment too.  
The expectancy theory (Vroom 1964) is addressed to understand the roles of these three barriers. The expectancy theory is 
also called as the valence-instrumentality-expectancy (VIE) model, where valence refers to the extent to which people 
consider the reward to be important to them, corresponding to the first barrier; instrumentality refers to the probability that 
high performance can lead to high reward, corresponding to the second barrier; expectancy refers to the probability that high 
effort can lead to high performance, corresponding to the third barrier. Therefore, expectancy theory is appropriate to explain 
solvers’ task participation behavior. 
In this study, beyond the original expectancy theory which postulates the linear relationship between VIE factors and effort, 
we attempt to understand the non-linear relationships in the expectancy theory, and our research interest focuses on the role 
of self efficacy which is found to have a more complex relationship with effort (Bandura 1982). To clearly state, our research 
objective is to understand the non-linear relationship between self efficacy and effort. 
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
Expectancy Theory Hypotheses 
Expectancy theory is widely used to investigate working motivation (Vroom 1964). The theory proposes that when a person 
makes decision on whether or not to behave in a certain way, s/he goes through a whole cognitive process to consider three 
key motivational elements: valence, instrumentality and expectancy. These three motivational elements are embedded in 
three sub-processes of decision making (as shown in Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Expectancy Theory 
The first stage is about the relationship between effort and performance: “what is the probability that I can achieve high 
performance if I spend much effort?” People’s perception about this probability is defined as expectancy. Self efficacy is 
considered as the most important factor relevant to expectancy and is always used as the proxy of expectancy (Gist and 
Mitchell 1992).  
At the second stage, people evaluate the relationship between performance and rewards: “If I achieve high performance, what 
is the probability that I can attain the rewards?” This probability is defined as instrumentality. In our research context, one 
key factor relevant to instrumentality is solvers’ trust beliefs on reward providers. If solvers consider that reward providers 
can keep their promise, the instrumentality is high. Thus, in this study, we use trust as the proxy of instrumentality. 
At the last stage, people should make judgment on the relationship between rewards and personal goals: “If I obtain the 
rewards, will my personal goals be satisfied?” In this study, we directly measure reward valence as the importance of gaining 
the monetary reward. 
Based on the expectancy theory, the research model can be depicted as Figure 2. According to the expectancy theory, we 
propose the direct effects of reward valence and trust on effort by arguing that when reward valence and trust are high, 
Effort Performance Reward Personal Goal 
Expectancy Instrumentality Valence 
Sun et al.  Non-Linear Relationships in the Expectancy Theory 
3 
Proceedings of the Eighteenth Americas Conference on Information Systems, Seattle, Washington, August 9-12, 2012. 
solvers are more likely to be motivated to spend effort on the online tasks (Vroom 1964). As to the role of self efficacy, we 
will further discuss its non-linear effects on effort later (Bandura 1982). Thus, we propose the following hypotheses first: 
H1: Reward valence is positively associated with effort. 
H2: Trust is positively associated with effort. 
 
Figure 2. Research Model 
Non-linear Relationship between Self Efficacy and Effort 
To better understand the relationship between self efficacy and effort, we reconceptualize the role of self-efficacy by 
proposing an activation-deactivation model. In this reconceptualization, we postulate that self efficacy plays two roles 
according to two different mechanisms. The first role is called activation role through which people will expend more effort 
on the task when they feel the probability to complete the task is high due to their high ability. The second role is called 
deactivation role through which people will expend less effort on the task when they feel that they are so efficacious that 
investing much effort is not needed. According to these two mechanisms, a three-stage non-linear model of self-efficacy can 
be expected (see Figure 3).  
 
 
Figure 3. An Activation-Deactivation Model of Self-Efficacy 
We propose that there are two thresholds setting the boundary of the linear relationship between self-efficacy and effort. The 
first threshold (e.g., activation threshold) determines when self-efficacy begins to exert its activation role. Before the 
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activation threshold, people’s self-efficacy is too low, limiting their effort at a very low level. The zone before the activation 
threshold is called as diffident zone.  
The second threshold deactivation threshold determines when self-efficacy starts to lose its effect on effort (e.g., deactivation 
role). After the deactivation threshold, people will not spend more effort on the task since they believe it is not needed. The 
zone after the deactivation threshold is called as overconfident zone.  
The zone between the activation and deactivation threshold is confident zone where following the increase of self-efficacy the 
expectancy to complete the task and the motivation to participate in the task increase, leading to more effort expended on the 
task.  
Based on the activation-deactivation model of self efficacy, we further theorize that the activation and deactivation thresholds 
are determined by the task complexity. Specifically, when task complexity is high, people will be motivated only when a high 
level of self-efficacy is achieved (e.g., high activation threshold); meanwhile, when task complexity is high, completing the 
task requires more effort, therefore, even at a relatively high level of self-efficacy, people may still would like to spend more 
effort (e.g., high deactivation threshold) (Bandura 1982). In this case, the activation-deactivation model can be illustrated in 
different ways under different levels of task complexity (see Figure 4).  
   
Figure 4. The Activation-Deactivation Model under Different Levels of Task Complexity 
 
When task complexity is high, both activation and deactivation thresholds are high. An extreme situation is that the 
deactivation threshold is so high that the overconfident zone disappears. When task complexity is low, both activation and 
deactivation thresholds are low. An extreme situation is that the activation threshold is so low that the diffident zone 
disappears. Therefore, when task complexity is high, the relationship between self efficacy and effort can be depicted as a 
convex curve while when task complexity is low, the relationship between self efficacy and effort is illustrated as a concave 
curve. 
Thus, we propose that, 
H3: The nonlinear relationship between self efficacy and effort is moderated by task complexity. 
H3a: A convex relationship between self efficacy and effort appears when task complexity is high. 
H3b: A concave relationship between self efficacy and effort appears when task complexity is low. 
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METHODOLOGY 
Research Setting and Participants 
Data was collected through a field survey in a crowdsourcing marketplace in China where it called Witkey website. China 
has occupied a leading position worldwide in developing crowdsourcing marketplace due to its huge amount of labors and 
small and medium enterprises (SME). Taskcn.com, which is one of the most popular Witkey website in China, is believed to 
be a suitable research setting for examining solvers’ online task participation behavior. 
Although there are many types of tasks posted on Taskcn.com, such as design, programming, strategic planning, and writing 
(Yang, Adamic and Ackerman 2008b), we only focus on the IT-relevant tasks, i.e., the final product should be an IT artifact 
(e.g., an website, a program, or a computer-aided Logo design). IT-relevant tasks occupy the majority of online tasks (over 
60% for Taskcn.com), and needs to be paid more attention. Thus, only solvers who have experience in the IT-related tasks 
are eligible for participating in the survey. 
Measures 
Instruments for most of constructs were adapted from prior relevant studies. Slight wording modifications were applied to fit 
the research context, and all measures used seven-point Likert scale. Effort is measured by three dimensions: attention, effort 
intensity and goal commitment (Kanfer 1991; Locke, Latham and Smith 1990). For each dimension, three items are adapted 
from Barrick et al. (2002). Reward valence is adapted from Sanchez et al. (Sanchez, Truxillo and Bauer 2000). The integrity 
dimension of trust is used to measure trust in this study. It is measured by four items adapted from McKnight et al. (2002). 
Self efficacy is measured by three items adapted from Kankanhalli et al. (2005). 
Procedure 
Taskcn.com in China was selected as the research site. Subjects were recruited by two means. First, the survey was open to 
voluntary participants. Interested subjects with IT design task experience could participate in the survey without invitation. 
Second, we sent invitation letters to 700 randomly selected participants with experience in IT design tasks. We obtained a 
total of 140 and 146 responses through these two channels, respectively. Among these responses, 205 usable responses were 
gathered. About 75% of subjects were male; 90% were around 21-35 (age); 80% with a bachelor degree; and 60% with over 
4 years of computer experience. 
DATA ANALYSIS 
Data analysis was conducted through two stages. At the first stage, the reliability and validity of constructs were assessed to 
ensure the appropriateness of the measurement model. At the second stage, the hypotheses were tested using moderated 
multiple regression analysis (Kankanhalli et al. 2005). 
Reliability and Validity  
Reliability can be assessed using Cronbach’s Alpha (Kankanhalli et al. 2005). A value of Alpha greater than .7 suggests a 
good reliability of the construct (Fornell and Larcker 1981). As shown in Table 1, alpha values for all the constructs were 
greater than .7, satisfying the suggested criteria. 
 
 Mean SD Alpha EFRT RWDV TRST SEFC TSKX 
EFRT 5.392 1.103 .907 1.000     
RWDV 6.091 0.916 .680 .465 1.000    
TRST 4.798 1.429 .918 .352 .249 1.000   
SEFC 5.540 1.145 .864 .310 .314 .204 1.000  
TSKX 4.423 1.279 .745 .108 .026 .030 -.109 1.000 
Table 1. Reliability and Correlations 
Note: EFRT=Effort; RWDV=Reward valence; TRST=Trust; SEFC=Self efficacy; TSKX=Task complexity. 
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 1 2 3 4 5 
EFTI1 .697 .306 .025 -.044 .228 
EFTI2 .725 .189 .153 -.092 .152 
EFTI3 .723 .114 .056 -.134 .197 
ATEN1 .724 .211 .253 -.017 .197 
ATEN2 .728 .160 .040 .037 .172 
ATEN3 .710 -.048 .111 .236 .110 
GLCM1 .766 .032 .184 .170 -.009 
GLCM2 .765 .064 .059 .161 .017 
GLCM3 .728 .087 -.039 .168 .103 
TRST1 .198 .836 .107 .146 .059 
TRST2 .191 .823 .009 .036 .109 
TRST3 .122 .901 .094 .081 .081 
TRST4 .111 .905 .108 .137 .025 
SEFC1 .195 .116 .830 -.059 .143 
SEFC2 .045 .062 .840 -.097 .150 
SEFC3 .215 .111 .848 -.089 .011 
TSKX1 .126 .139 -.186 .819 .077 
TSKX2 .350 .310 -.023 .575 .034 
TSKX3 .000 .070 -.039 .860 .057 
RWDV1 .163 .023 .312 .138 .677 
RWDV2 .281 .126 .183 .013 .715 
RWDV3 .224 .098 -.090 .040 .783 
Eigenvalue 7.320 2.953 2.400 1.644 1.301 
% of variance 30.501 12.306 10.001 6.851 5.421 
Cumulative % 30.501 42.807 52.808 59.659 65.081 
Table 2. Loadings and Cross-Loadings 
Note: EFTI=Effort intensity; ATEN=Attention; GLCM=Goal commitment; they are three dimensions of Effort. 
Both the convergent and discriminant validity can be assessed using the exploratory factor analysis (EFA). When item 
loadings on the expected constructs are high enough, the convergent validity is achieved. When the cross-loadings are 
smaller than the item loadings, the discriminant validity is achieved. All the items loaded high on the expected constructs, 
suggesting good convergent validity. As item loadings were higher than the cross-loadings, the good discriminant validity 
was identified too (see Table 2). 
A self-report survey, where the same subject responds to the items in a single questionnaire at the same point in time, is likely 
to be susceptible to the common method variance (CMV) or common method bias (CMB), which may compromise the 
credibility of the data analysis results (Malhotra, Kim and Patil 2006). Harman’s one-factor test, a widely used method in 
assessing CMV/B, was performed address this issue (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee and Podsakoff 2003). As shown in Table 2, 
the most covariance explained by one factor was 30.5%, indicating that CMV/B is not a likely contaminant of the results. 
Hypotheses Tests 
A hierarchical regression analysis was performed to test the hypotheses (Kankanhalli et al. 2005; Sharma, Durand and Gur 
Arie 1981). As shown in Table 3, three regression models were executed to test the moderated nonlinear effect of self 
efficacy on effort. In the first model, the main effects of the control variable task complexity and three factors (e.g., reward 
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valence, trust, and self efficacy) were entered into the regression. The results showed that reward valence (β=.328, t=5.178) 
and trust (β=.170, t=2.673) had positive effects on effort, lending supports to H1 and H2. The nonlinear effects of self 
efficacy (e.g., the quadratic component) were considered in Model 2. The results showed that no significant nonlinear effect 
of self efficacy was found (β=-.019, t=-.268). In model 3, the moderating effect of task complexity was considered. The 
results showed that the moderated nonlinear effect of self efficacy on effort was significant (β=.187, t=2.515). Including this 
moderating effect made the R-square increase from .327 to .348 with the significant level of F-change p=.013. 
 
 Model I Model II Model III 
 β t β t β t 
Task Complexity .192** 3.045 .195** 3.037 .098 1.323 
Reward Valence .328** 5.178 .327** 5.162 .281*** 4.308 
Trust .170** 2.673 .170** 2.659 .180** 2.847 
Self Efficacy .193** 3.054 .205** 2.690 .230** 3.032 
Self Efficacy2   .019 0.268 .049 .691 
Self Efficacy2 x Task Complexity     .187* 2.515 
R2 .326 .327 .348 
R2 Change  .001 .021 
F Change  .072 6.327* 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. 
Table 3. Regression Results 
 
To further investigate the moderated nonlinear relationship, we compared the mean value of effort under different levels of 
self efficacy and task complexity. As shown in Table 4, each case had two labels: one label to indicate the level of self 
efficacy (low vs. moderate vs. high) and one label to indicate the level of task complexity (low vs. high). Median values were 
used to separate these cases. According to these two labels, the whole sample was separated into six sub-groups. Then, we 
compared the mean value of effort under different situations. The results showed that when task complexity was high, there 
was a significant difference in effort between the high and moderate level of self efficacy (∆=0.483, t=1.947) but an 
insignificant difference between the high and moderate level of self efficacy (∆=0.335, t=1.541), suggesting a convex curve 
and supporting H3a. In contrast, when task complexity was low, there was a significant difference in effort between the low 
and moderate level of self efficacy (∆=0.850, t=3.287) but an insignificant difference between the high and moderate level of 
self efficacy (∆=0.049, t=.201), suggesting a concave curve and supporting H3b. The results were also illustrated in Figure 5. 
 
 Low TSKX High TSKX 
 Low 
SEFC 
Moderate 
SEFC 
High 
SEFC 
Low SEFC Moderate 
SEFC 
High 
SEFC 
Frequency 31 36 33 39 44 22 
Percent (%) 15.1 17.6 16.1 19.0 21.5 10.7 
Mean of Effort 4.613 5.463 5.512 5.248 5.583 6.066 
Low vs. Moderate ∆=0.850, t=3.287***  ∆=0.335, t=1.541  
High vs. Moderate  ∆=0.049, t=0.201  ∆=0.483, t=1.947* 
TSKX=Task Complexity; SEFC=Self Efficacy; One-tailed t-test: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. 
Table 4. The Moderated Non-Linear Effect Test 
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Figure 5. The Moderated Non-Linear Effect 
Note: TSKX=Task Complexity 
 
DISCUSSIONS, IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
Discussions of the Results 
This study attempts to understand the non-linear relationships in the expectancy theory, specifically, the moderated nonlinear 
effect of task complexity on the relationship between self efficacy and effort. The key findings can be summarized as follows. 
First, the results show the significant positive effects of reward valence and trust. The positive relationship between reward 
valence and effort indicates that when people perceive gaining reward in the online task participation process as important, 
they will be more likely to be motivated to actively participate in the online tasks and to expend more effort. The positive 
relationship between trust and effort suggests that when solvers trust that reward providers will keep their promise, they need 
not to worry about reward providers’ opportunistic behavior and would like to invest more effort. 
Second, the moderated nonlinear effect of task complexity on the relationship between self efficacy and effort indicates that 
under different levels of task complexity, the non-linear relationships between self efficacy and effort are different. 
Specifically, the results show that when task complexity is high, self efficacy works only when self efficacy is moderate and 
high. As to the low level of self efficacy, solvers may still feel the task is too difficult to be completed. In contrast, when task 
complexity is low, self efficacy works only when self efficacy is low and moderate. As to the high level of self efficacy, 
solvers may feel the task is too easy to invest much effort. 
Theoretical Implications 
Theoretical implications of this study can be discussed from several aspects. First, as to our knowledge, this is the first study 
that attempts to understand the predictors of effort in the crowdsourcing marketplace by addressing the expectancy theory. 
Although there have been several studies researching on why people would like to expend effort in the open source software 
(OSS) communities (Ke et al. 2009), the predictors of solvers’ effort investment in the crowdsourcing context is rarely 
examined. In particular, previous studies on crowdsourcing have not recognized the similarity between crowdsourcing 
marketplace (a new working mode) and conventional working. Therefore, utilizing the expectancy theory which is the most 
famous theory in working motivation as a new theoretical perspective to understand the phenomenon in crowdsourcing 
marketplace appropriately captures this feature. This study confirms the applicability of expectancy theory in the 
crowdsourcing context and encourage future researchers to consider it as an important theoretical underpinning when 
studying solver behavior in crowdsourcing marketplaces. 
Second, this study challenges the linear relationship between self efficacy and effort and proposes an activation-deactivation 
model to describe the non-linear relationship between self efficacy and effort (i.e., moderated nonlinear relationship). Our 
findings suggest researchers to deeply think about this relationship by considering both the non-linear nature and the 
moderating role of task complexity. This study can extend the expectancy theory by deeply exploiting the comprehensive 
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relationship between self efficacy and effort. Future researchers using expectancy theory as the theoretical basis could further 
investigate how the non-linear relationship between self efficacy and effort changes along with task complexity. 
Practical Implications 
According to the theoretical implications, several practical implications also could be derived from the study. First, both 
crowdsourcing marketplaces and reward providers should engage in the development of incentive mechanisms and trust 
mechanisms. For the crowdsourcing marketplaces, they should provide certain benchmark criteria for reward providers to set 
the reward and for solvers to select the task. They also should pay attention to the strategies to avoid the opportunistic 
behavior of reward providers, such as warranty policy, identity confirmation, and reputation systems. For the reward 
providers, they should learn how to appropriately set the reward to leverage solvers motivation and to keep their promise if 
they want to use the crowdsourcing marketplaces to facilitate their business in a long-run. Second, task complexity should be 
appropriately set according to solver’s ability. Crowdsourcing marketplaces can design a recommendation system to help 
solvers select the task. Through the recommendation system, solvers can easily know which task is with the complexity that 
can fully leverage their self efficacy.  
Limitations 
Despite valuable implications obtained from the results, there are some limitations of this study. First, the study focuses on 
IT-relevant tasks, such as website design, programming, and Logo design and so on. However, there are various task types on 
crowdsourcing marketplaces. Besides IT-relevant tasks, tasks relevant to business strategic plan, translation, and writing are 
also available on the website. It still calls for future investigation to examine the generalizability of the results. Second, the 
study was conducted in a specific crowdsourcing marketplace in China. However, prior studies on culture postulate that 
individuals with different cultural background have different behavioral motivations (Hofstede 1980). Future studies should 
pay attention to the cross-culture issue and compare the results in different cultural contexts based on our proposed research 
model. 
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APPENDIX - MEASURES 
 
Reward Valence (RWDV): Adapted from Sanchez et al. (2000) 
RWDV1: I would like to get the monetary rewards for the online tasks. 
RWDV2: To me, whether gaining the rewards or not is very important. 
RWDV3: It would be good to get the monetary rewards. 
 
Trust: Adapted from McKnight et al. (2002) 
TRST1: The reward providers on the Taskcn.com are trustworthy 
TRST2: The reward providers on Taskcn.com will keep their promises to give awards to those who complete the task best. 
TRST3: I would characterize reward providers on Taskcn.com as honest. 
TRST4: Reward providers on Taskcn.com are sincere and genuine. 
 
Self-efficacy (SEFC): Adapted from Kankanhalli et al. (2005) 
SEFC1: I am competent at completing the tasks on the Taskcn.com. 
SEFC2: I have the expertise needed to complete the tasks on the Taskcn.com. 
SEFC3: I have confidence in my ability to complete the tasks on the Taskcn.com. 
 
Task Complexity (TSKX): Adapted from Yeo et al. (2004), Taylor (1981), and Seijts et al. (2004) 
TSKX1: I find that completing the tasks on the Taskcn.com is: 1=not difficult at all, 7=extremely difficult. 
TSKX2: Completing the tasks on the Taskcn.com is a challenge to me.  
TSKX3: I find the tasks on the Taskcn.com are very complex. 
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Effort – Effort Intensity: Adapted from Barrick et al. (2002) 
EFTI1: I work at my full capacity to finish the tasks on the Taskcn.com. 
EFTI2: I try hard to finish the tasks on the Taskcn.com. 
EFTI3: I put a lot of effort into completing tasks on the Taskcn.com. 
 
Effort – Attention: Adapted from Barrick et al. (2002) 
ATEN1: I frequently think about getting the tasks on the Taskcn.com done. 
ATEN2: I focus my attention on completing tasks on the Taskcn.com. 
ATEN3: I often consider how I can get more tasks on the Taskcn.com done. 
 
Effort – Goal Commitment: Adapted from Barrick et al. (2002) 
GLCM1: I persist in overcoming obstacles to complete tasks. 
GLCM2: I never give up trying to finish the tasks. 
GLCM3: I am strongly committed to pursuing the goal of finishing the tasks. 
 
